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REPLY ARGUMENT 
EIPHD claims not to be subject to attorney fees under 512-117 because it is not an "agency" 
under IAPA. Inconsistently, EIPHD claims not to  be subject to attorney fees under 512-121 because the 
litigation constituted judicial review of EIPHD's "agency" action under IAPA. If EIPHD is an agency under 
IAPA, attorney fees under 512-117 are mandatory. If EIPHD is not an agency under IAPA, attorney fees 
under 512-121 are appropriate. Under either 512-117 or 512-121 Appellants are entitled to attorney 
fees because EIPHD acted unreasonably and without authority at administrative agency and District 
Court level. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
Appellants do not object to any statements made in respondent's brief regarding the standard 
of review on appeal. 
B. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER IDAHO CODE 512-117 
I. APPELLANTS WERE PREVAILING PARN 
Because ElPHD does not dispute that Appellants were prevailing party at the district court level 
(See Respondent's Brief, pg. lo), Appellants will not provide further argument to the Court on this issue. 
II. EIPHD IS A STATE AGENCY FOR PURPOSES OF IDAHO CODE 912-117 
ElPHD contends that it is not a state agency for purposes of ldaho Code 512-117 because the 
legislature has stated in ldaho Code 939-401, that ElPHD is not a part of any of the departments or 
agencies of state government authorized by Section 20, Article IV, of the ldaho Constitution or ldaho 
Code 967-2402. See Respondent's Brief, pg. 11-12. However, a "state agency" for purposes of 912-117 is 
defined by ldaho Code 567-5201, not by Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution, ldaho Code 967-2402, 
or ldaho Code 039-401. Specifically, ldaho Code 512-117 states: "For purposes of this section ...( b) 'State 
agency' shall mean any agency as defined in section 67-5201, ldaho Code." (Emphasis Added). The clear 
intention is that any agency subject to judicial review under the ldaho Administrative Procedure Act, 
Chapter 52, Title 67, ldaho Code, (of which 967-5201 is a part) is  subject to attorney fees under ldaho 
Code 912-117. 
The District Court claimed that "the proper characterization of a health district is  not readily 
apparent from ldaho Case law or statutory law."See Memorandum Decision and Order, dated 
November 1, 2007, pg. 2, Clerk's Record, pg. 165. The District Court noted that a health district is at 
times called a "local agency" (see ldaho Code 99-337), a "political subdivision" (Idaho Code 96-902), and 
a "legislatively created administrative agency for a specific limited purpose," (see The District Boardof 
Health Number Five v. Chancey, 94 ldaho 944,949,500 P.2d 845,850 (1972)). What is apparent is that 
the legislature chooses labels to classify health districts based upon the explicit requirements of each 
distinct statute. 
When the legislature determines that actions by governmental entities which the legislature 
labels as "local agencies" or "political subdivisions" are subject to judicial review under the ldaho 
Administrative Procedure Act of Title 67, Chapter 52 of the ldaho Code [IAPA], those governmental 
entities are "agencies" within the definition of IAPA in 967-5201. See Crown v. City of Sun Valley, 144 
ldaho 72,74-75,156 P.3d 573 (2007) ("For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, a local agency 
making a land use decision is treated as a government agency under [IAPA]."(Emphasis Added)); See 
also Evans v. Teton County, 139 ldaho 71,74,73 P.3d 84 (2003) (Finding that a County Board of 
Commissioners is treated as an agency under IAPA when the legislature makes the Board of 
Commissioners actions subject to  IAPA by statute.) 
ElPHD acknowledges that "[aln 'agency' under 567-5201 is a 'state entity empowered to affect 
an individual's legal rights or duties." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 10 (citing Peterson v. Franklin County, 
130 ldaho 176,182,938 P.2d 1214 (1997). EIPHD was created by the state and has been given power 
and authority to affect individuals' legal rights and duties through rule making and the determination of 
contested case proceedings. ldaho Code 539-408 states: "There is hereby established within the state of 
ldaho seven (7) public health districts ..!I Within each public health district, the State of ldaho 
established a "district health department." ldaho Code 539-409. The State has delegated rulemaking 
authority to each district health department. See ldaho Code 539-413 and 539-416. "Eveiy rule or 
standard adopted, amended, or rescinded by the district board shall be done in a manner conforming to 
the provisions of chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code." ldaho Code $39-416 (Emphasis Added). Each District 
Health Department is also empowered to affect individuals' legal rights and duties. ldaho Code 539-414 
(1) and (2). District Health Departments are given authority to conduct contested cases. ldaho Code 539- 
417. Because District Health Departments have been delegated authority to affect an individual's legal 
rights and duties by rulemaking and contested case determinations, District Health Department actions 
are subject to judicial review under IAPA. ldaho Code 539-418. ("Judicial review of a final determination 
of the district board may be secured by any person ... as prescribed by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho 
Code ...'I( Emphasis Added). 
EIPHD argues that "[tlhe ldaho Supreme Court has held the definition of 'agency' under 967- 
5201 indicates that it is intended to apply to 'state administrative agencies, and not local governing 
bodies." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 11 (citing ldaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council of 
City of Boise, 134 ldaho 651,653,8 P.3d 646 (2000). EIPHD then claims that county or city governments, 
city councils, county boards of commissioners, and Boards of Trustees for school districts do not fall 
within the definition of "agency" in 967-5201. Respondent's Brief, pg. 11. EIPHD failed to acknowledge 
that in ldoho Historic Preservation Council, Inc., the Supreme Court specifically found that there are 
statutory exceptions where local governing bodies, such as city councils and county boards of 
commissioners do fit within the "agency" definition of 967-5201.134 ldaho at 653. Immediately after 
the general statement quoted by EIPHD, the Court in ldaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. stated: 
There are a few statutory exceptions to this general rule, however. For example, the Local Land 
Use Planning Act, Chapter 65, Title 67 of the ldaho Code, provides that a person aggrieved by a 
planning and zoning decision 'may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been 
exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho 
Code! I.C. 67-6521. See also I.C. 923-1016(4) (stating that a city council is an 'agency' for the 
purposes of applying the judicial review provisions of the IAPA to a city council decision to deny 
an application for or the transfer or renewal of a license to sell beer.) 
Id. (Emphasis Added). EIPHD also f i ts within one of these statutory exceptions because Chapter 4, Title 
39, of the ldaho Code expressly provides that a person aggrieved by the actions of a public health district 
is entitled to judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code. 
Like a Health District, city councils and county planning and zoning boards are not a part of any 
of the twenty (20) departments of state government authorized by Section 20, Article IV, ldaho 
Constitution, or a part of any of the departments of the state described in section 67-2402, ldaho Code. 
Cities, counties and public health districts are "local agencies" under ldaho Code 99-337. Cities, counties 
and public health districts are "political subdivisions" under ldaho Code 96-902. Case law and statutory 
precedent establishes that cities and county boards of commissioners are "agencies" under ldaho Code 
565-5201, whenever such entities are subject to  judicial review under Chapter 52, Title 67. 
Regarding cities, ldaho Code $23-1016(4) states: 
An applicant denied a license, transfer or renewal thereof or aggrieved by a decision of the city 
council pursuant to this section, may within twenty-eight (28) days, after all remedies have been 
exhausted under city ordinances and procedures, seek judicial review under the procedures 
provided in chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code, and for such purposes a city shall be construed to 
mean an agency. 
(Emphasis Added). Regarding local governing bodies (including counties and cities) responsible for local 
land use planning, ldaho Code 567-6521(1)(d) states: "An affected person aggrieved by a decision may 
within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek 
judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code." (Emphasis Added). The ldaho Supreme 
Court recently interpreted the meaning of ldaho Code 567-6521(1)(d) stating: 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek judicial review of an 
approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for in the ldaho Administrative 
Procedural Act (IDA-PA). I.C. 567-6521(1)(d); Evons v. Teton County, 139 ldaho 71,74,73 P.3d 
84,87 (2003). For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, a local agency making a land 
use decision is treated as a government agency under IDAPA. Evons, 139 at 74,73 P.3d at 87. 
Crown v. City of Sun Volley, 144 ldaho 72,74-75,156 P.3d 573 (2007)(Emphasis Added). In Allen v. Bloine 
County, the Court held "...a county board of commissioners is treated as an administrative agency for 
purposes of judicial review." 131 ldaho 138,140, 953 P.2d 578 (1998). Applicable law is undeniably clear 
that both cities and counties qualify as "agencies" for purposes of ldaho Code 565-5201, when the 
legislature declares that certain "actions" by such local agencies are subject to judicial review under 
Chapter 52, Title 67, ldaho Code. 
ldaho Code 539-418 provides that judicial review "...as prescribed by Chapter 52, title 67, ldaho 
Code ... shall be the exclusive procedure forappeal or review..!' of district health department actions. By 
the same legal reasoning that cities and counties are "agencies" under ldaho Code 567-5201 when their 
actions are subject to judicial review, public health districts are also "agencies" under ldaho Code 567- 
5201 when their actions are subject to judicial review. 
EIPHD's response brief lists several other single purpose districts, however, EIPHD does not 
analyze whether any other single purpose district established by the State of ldaho is subject to judicial 
review under IAPA. Under the authority set forth in Crown v. City ofSun Valley, the most important 
factor in deciding whether or not a governmental entity is "treated as an agency" for purposes of I.C. 
567-5201, is whether the governmental entity is subject to  judicial review under IAPA and not whether 
the single purpose districts are "state agencies or departments" for purposes of Section 20, Article IV of 
the Constitution or I.C. 567-2402. 
Finally, EIPHD argues that "EIPHD has never claimed that it is a state agency, nor could it ever be 
so under the current statutory framework." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 15. This allegation is simply 
false. EiPHD has repeatedly claimed that statutes applicable to an "agency," were applicable to EIPHD. 
that EIPHD undertook"agency action" and that this proceeding must be decided under the "agency 
record," compiled in accordance with IAPA. A non-exhaustive list of such claims is as follows: 
1. "While an administrative agency's power and duties must originate from appropriate legislation; 
once established, the agency is cloaked with the requisite power to carry out its delegated 
duty." Clerk's Record, pg. 91, Brief in Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Declaratory 
Judgment RE: Jurisdiction and Motion for Relief From Agency Action, pg. 8. 
2. "Current conditions require, at the very least, the re-imposition of sanitary restrictions which 
constitute the 'agency action' which is the subject matter of these proceedings." Clerk's Record, 
pg. 95, Brief in Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Declaratory Judgment RE: Jurisdiction and 
Motion for Relief From Agency Action, pg. 13. 
3. "For the reasons stated herein and on the basis of the extensive Agency Record filed in these 
proceedings..!' Id. 
4. "The Petition for Review of the decision of the board of health certainly falls under the realm of 
the Administrative Procedures Act." See Brief in Support of Respondent's Objection to Motion 
for Award of Appellants' Attorney Fees and Costs and Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs, pg. 13, 
Clerk's Record, pg. 125. 
5. See also Respondent's Admission that "Plaintiffs are parties aggrieved by a final Order of 
Defendant's Board of Health entered in a contested case and Plaintiffs are entitled to judicial 
review of such Order pursuant to ... ldaho Code 067-5270." Clerk's Record, pg. 53, Answer and 
Reply, pg. 3, para. 4 admitting the above quoted portion of para. 4 of the Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment and Judicial Review. (Idaho Code 567-5270(1) states: "Jkidicial review of 
agency action shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter unless other provision of law is 
applicable to the particular matter."(Emphasis Added)). 
6. "That the Respondent be awarded i ts costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred and to be 
incurred herein in accordance with ldaho law including ldaho Code §§12-117 and 12-121." 
(Emphasis Added). Clerk's Record, pg. 58, Answer and Reply, pg. 8. 
EIPHD did not begin claiming to be something other than an agency under Chapter 52, Title 67, ldaho 
Code until after Appellants filed their Motion for Award of Appellants' Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant 
to ldaho Code 912-117. See Respondent's Objection to Motion for Award of Appellants' Attorney Fees 
and Costs, pg. 2, para. 1, Clerk's record, pg. 112-21. ElPHD seeks all of the protection, but none of the 
responsibilities, which result from its agency status. 
There is no dispute that ldaho Code 567-5270 and 939-418 provide Appellants with judicial 
review of EIPHD's "agency action." "'Agency action' means: (c) an agency's performance of, or failure to 
perform any duty placed on it by law!' ldaho Code 967-5201. EIPHD's performance of its powers and 
duties under ldaho Code 539-414 (constituting the "agency action" that gave rise to the contested case 
between the Appellants and EIPHD) subject ElPHD to IAPA. Clearly ElPHD is an "agency" for purposes of 
ldaho Code 567-5201 and is therefore subject to an award of attorney fees under ldaho Code 512-117. 
ldaho Code 912-117 is not limited to the twenty "state agencies and departments" prescribed in 
ldaho Code 567-2402, instead it allows an award of attorney fees against "any agency as defined in 
section 67-5201, ldaho Code!' (Emphasis Added). ElPHD clearly fits within the definition of "any agency" 
because the legislature specifically provided for application of Chapter 52, Title 67 of the ldaho Code to 
public health districts. See ldaho Code 539-418. 
ill: ElPHD ACTED WITHOUTA REASONABLE BASIS IN LAW AND IN FACT 
ElPHD argues that it had a reasonable basis in law and in fact to reimpose sanitary restrictions 
because it believed "there was a public health concern reasonably prompting some action on the part of 
EIPHD." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 17. The fact that ElPHD believed it had a reasonable basis to take 
"some action" does not shield ElPHD from liability when it (1) takes action that is not supported by the 
facts it alleges and (2) knowingly takes action that is clearly and unambiguously delegated to a different 
state agency. 
a. No Reasonable Factual Basis Existed For Reimposition of Sanitary Restrictions 
In order to have a reasonable basis in fact, ElPHD must have reasonably believed that facts 
existed, which if proven to be true, would support the agency action taken. ldaho Code 550-1326 
identifies two specific factual scenarios under which re-imposition of sanitary restrictions would be 
factually justified: (1) if construction is not in compliance with approved plans and specifications; or (2) 
the facilities do not substantially comply with regulatorystandards in effect at the time of facility 
construction. Neither of those two factual scenarios were identified by ElPHD in the documents titled 
"NOTICE OF INTENTTO REIMPOSE SANITARY RESTRICTIONS." See Notice of lntent, dated September 21, 
2006, Agency Record for Judicial Review, Exhibit No. 1, and Notice of lntent dated November 21,2006, 
Agency Record, Exhibit No. 8. ElPHD clearly states that they "define the reason" for their re-imposition 
action as follows: 
On June 9,2006 it was announced that the subsurface disposal system that sewices the 
Sunnyside Industrial & Professional Park had failed. Two options were announced to correct the 
problem, 1) either connect to  the City of ldaho Falls through annexation or 2) install a large soil 
absorption system that meets the flow needs of the Park. 
To date, no permanent correction has taken place. For this reason, we hereby reimpose 
sanitary restrictions. 
Notice of lntent, dated September 21,2006, Agency Record, Exhibit No. l.(Emphasis Added). 
Furthermore, the only factual basis for re-imposition argued by ElPHD is that "Appellants' septic tank 
was overflowing causing sewage to pool on the surface of the property." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 17. 
Respondent continues to argue, even on appeal, that the reimposition of sanitary restrictions was 
undertaken "since no permanent correction had taken place as requested." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 
3. Those facts, even if proven to be true, do not meet the statutory requirements of ldaho Code 550- 
1326 for re-imposition of sanitary restrictions by any state agency, including EIPHD. 
IDAPA 58.01.03.004.05 provides the appropriate agency action when a system fails: "The owner 
of any failing system shall obtain a permit and cause the failing system's repair...". If EIPHD proved that 
Appellants' system 'failed" and that Appellants refused to comply with IDAPA 58.01.03.004.05, then 
EIPHD would have a factual basis to pursue an enforcement action pursuant to ldaho Code 539-117. See 
IDAPA 58.01.03.012.03. However, the record is clear that Appellants did obtain a permit and caused the 
failing system's repair in accordance with the statute prior to September 21,2006. See "Permit," dated 
June 29,2006, Agency Record, Appellants' Exhibit H, and "Notice of Inspection," dated July 2,2006, 
Agency Record, Appellants' Exhibit I. No additional failures occurred, yet EIPHD proceeded to reimpose 
sanitary restrictions anyway, after Applicants were in compliance with the applicable IDAPA provision. 
Significantly, EIPHD identified to Appellants that if additional failures occurred, Appellants would be 
subject to fines and penalties under ldaho Code 539-117 prior to the re-imposition of sanitary 
restrictions. See June 28,2006 letter of Kellye Eager, Agency Record, Respondent's Exhibit No. 9. 
("According to ldaho Code $39-117, you may be subject to fines of up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) 
or one thousand dollars ($1,000) per day for continuing violations, whichever is greater .... Failure to 
meet these timelines will force us to begin legal action!'). EIPHD did not inform Appellants that they 
would be subject to  reimposition of sanitary restrictions because of the system's June 9,2006 
temporary overload. Despite the fact that Appellants obtained a permit and caused the system's repair 
and no additional failures had occurred, EiPHD decided that the legislature's choices of remedy for a 
failed system were insufficient and proceeded to re-impose sanitary restrictions on the basis that the 
system "had failed" and "no permanent correction has taken place." See Notice of intent, dated 
September 21,2006, Agency Record, Exhibit No. 1. For a system that "had failed" the legislature 
required a permit to  repair the system, not a "permanent correction" consisting of installation of a 
entirely new system or connection to the City's system. There was no reasonable, factual basis for the 
re-imposition of sanitary restrictions on the subdivision plat. 
b. No Reasonable Basis In Law Existed For Reimposition of Sanitary Restrictions by 
EIPHD 
EIPHD did not have a reasonable basis in law for reimposition of sanitary restrictions. EIPHD 
claims that "EIPHD also reasonably believed that it was the 'responsible agency' to 're-impose sanitary 
restrictions for water and sewer systems' for which it had originally lifted sanitary restrictions!' See 
Respondent's Brief, pg. 18. EIPHD cites to the MOU provisions regarding reimposition of sanitary 
restrictions which provides that "DEQ will: ... Reimpose sanitary restrictions for water and sewer systems 
under DEQ's responsibility," and "Districts will: ... Reimpose sanitary restrictions for water and sewer 
systems under District's responsibility." See Clerk's Record, pg. 39. Nowhere in the MOU does it provide 
that reimposition of sanitary restrictions should be based upon which agency originally lifted sanitary 
restrictions. Id. Idaho Code 950-1326 delegated all authority over sanitary restrictions to DEQ, not a 
public health district. See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 6, Clerk's Record, pg. 105. The District 
Court held, after carefully analyzing the Memorandum of Understanding between DEQ and the public 
health districts that: "it is clear that DEQ reserved and retained jurisdiction and authority over central 
systems, including the authority to issue a certificate of disapproval and to reimpose sanitary 
restrictions." Id., pg. 8, Clerk's Record, pg. 107. The District Court noted: "...statements made by District 
Seven personnel as contained in the Agency Record indicate an understanding and acknowledgment 
that DEQ has retained such control over central systems." Id. Furthermore, EIPHD's Board of Health 
affirmed the re-imposition of sanitary restrictions despite i ts acknowledgement that DEQ has exclusive 
jurisdiction: 
The Board of Health recognizes that jurisdiction for a central sewer system for the subdivision is 
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Quality and the Appellants are 
referred to the Department of Environmental Quality for what-ever follow up actions may be 
necessary for approval of an appropriate central sewage treatment system or other remedies. 
See Order on Remand From the District Court, pg. 2, Supplemental Agency Record For Judicial Review 
Following Remand, Exhibit 19. (Emphasis Added). There simply is no basis for the Court to  find that 
EIPHD "reasonably believed, however erroneously" that it had authority to re-impose sanitary 
restrictions on a central system. Instead, ElPHD absolutely knew that the central system was under 
DEQ's exclusive jurisdiction after having referred the sewer system to DEQfor enforcement. See January 
25, 2007, hearing transcript, pg. 38, In. 14-21, Agency Record, Exhibit No. 17, Rehearing Exhibit 8 ("DEQ 
has been part of this process from the beginning. We brought them into our office to see if we could 
work something out together. Gave a referral package to DEQ. DEQ is sitting on it. They are looking at 
it."). Because ElPHD had referred the sewer system to DEQfor enforcement and indicated an 
understanding and acknowledgement that reimposition of sanitary restrictions on central systems was 
the sole responsibility and jurisdiction of DEQ, ElPHD lacked any reasonable basis in law to believe it had 
authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions. 
ElPHD also claims that "EIPHD's authority, accordingly, presented a legitimate question for the 
District Court to determine." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 18. There was no dispute, and instead explicit 
acknowledgement by ElPHD that DEQ retained jurisdiction to reimpose sanitary restrictions on all 
central systems. See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 8, Clerk's Record pg. 107. ElPHD did not 
present any "legitimate question" for the District Court to determine regarding authority over central 
sewer systems. Accordingly, the District Court held: "There is no genuine dispute that at all times 
relevant the septic system utilized by Appellants fell within the definition of a central system." Id. pg. 7, 
Clerk's Record, pg. 108. A dispute that is not "genuine" can hardly be called "legitimate." There simply 
was not a legitimate dispute presented to the District Court. ElPHD knew that it was acting outside i ts 
jurisdiction, but decided to take action anyway only because ElPHD felt like DEQwas "sitting on" the 
enforcement referral ElPHD made. See Transcript of January 25,2007 hearing, pg. 38, In. 18-19, 
Supplemental Record, Exhibit No. 17, Exhibit B ("Gave a referral package to DEQ. DEQ is sitting on it!'). 
The District Court in analyzing whether EIPHD acted with a reasonable basis in law or fact 
acknowledged the existence of "a number of cases" supporting Appellants' argument "that if there is a 
finding that a governmental entity subject to 12-117 acts beyond its authority, such a conclusion 
mandates the finding that the entity acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law ..." See 
Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 3, Clerk's Record, pg. 166. The District Court then cited to two 
cases to support its determination that in certain cases "attorney fees [are] not warranted despite the 
fact that the governmental entity was found to be acting beyond i ts authority." Id. (referencing Rincover 
v. State Dept of Finance, Securities Bureau, 132 ldaho 547,976 P.2d 473 (1999) and Poyette River 
Properties Owners Association v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, 132 ldaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 
(1999). In Rincover v. State Dept. of Finance, Securities Bureau, the Supreme Court actually held: "The 
Department did not act without or contrary to statutory authority, or ignore or refuse to comply with 
duties imposed by statute!' 132 ldaho 547,550,976 P.2d 473 (1999) (Emphasis Added). Likewise, in 
Payettee River Properties Owners Association v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, the Supreme 
Court did not make a finding that the County acted without or contrary to statutory authority. 132 ldaho 
551,976 P.2d 477 (1999). The two cases relied upon by the District Court to justif\/ the denial of attorney 
fees simply do not support the holding. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the general rule mandating attorney 
fees where there is no statutoryauthority, however that exception is not applicable to this case. In 
Ralph Naylor Farms v. Lotoh Cty., the Court after affirming the general rule, stated: "However, if an 
agency's actions are based upon a 'reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute,' 
then attorney fees should not be awarded." 144 ldaho 806,809,172 P.3d 1081 (2007) (citing ldaho 
Potato Comm'n v. Russet Valley Produce, lnc., 127 ldaho 654,661,904 P.2d 566,573 (1995). The 
Supreme Court recently denied attorney fees under 512-117 based upon similar reasoning. Ameritel Inns 
v. The Pocateilo-Chubbuck, Docket No. 33448 (Idaho Ct.App. 7-23-2008). As stated above, EIPHD failed 
to present a "legitimate question" to the District Court regarding EIPHD's authority. Instead, the District 
Court found that "...it is clear that DEQ resewed and retained jurisdiction and authority over central 
systems ..." and "...statements made by District Seven personnel as contained in the Agency Record 
indicate an understanding and acknowledgement that DEQ has retained control over central systems." 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 8, Clerk's Record, pg. 107 (Emphasis Added). This was not an 
instance where the agency was confused by an ambiguous statute. ElPHD repeatedly acknowledged its 
understanding that DEQ had retained jurisdiction over central systems, and referred the matter to DEQ 
for enforcement. ElPHD has not claimed that the IDAPA provision defining a "central system" is in any 
way ambiguous and ElPHD has not challenged on Appeal the District Court's determination that "[tlhere 
is no genuine dispute that at al l  time relevant the septic system utilized by Appellants fell within the 
definition of a central system." See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 7, Clerk's Record, pg. 106. 
In this case, the District Court made the following specific finding which also has not been 
challenged on Appeal by EIPHD: "District Seven's [EIPHD] issuance of a Certificate of Disapproval and its 
reimposition of sanitary restrictions on the subject property was without authority. The actions of 
agencies or departments taken without appropriate authority are deemed void." See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, pg. 9, Clerk's Record pg. 108. (Emphasis Added). ElPHD failed to raise any genuine, 
legitimate issue that it had any authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions. Because EIPHD had 
absolutely no statutory authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions, ElPHD did not have a reasonable 
basis in law or fact for the actions it chose to take. The fact that DEQ was "sitting on it" is not sufficient 
to give ElPHD a reasonable basis for knowingly usurping DEWS jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, 
an award of attorney fees to Appellants under Idaho Code 912-117 is mandatory. 
C. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER IDAHO CODE 512-121 
I. THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT COMMENCED A ClVlL ACTION 
Appellants were entitled to commence a civil action by the filing of a Petition for Declaratory 
Judgment, in addition to the right to seek judicial review. Under ldaho Code 539-417 Appellants were 
entitled to seek "a hearing before the district board and/or such other relief or remedy as is provided or 
available." (Emphasis Added). Notably, ldaho Code 539-417 does not limit a party to seeking only 
judicial review or making a choice between judicial review and declaratory judgment. ldaho Code 567- 
5278 allows a party to  file a petition for declaratory judgment and the statute provides: "[a] declaratory 
judgment may be rendered whether or not the Appellants has requested the agency to pass upon the 
validity or applicability of the rule in question." 
Because of the "and/or" language in 539-417, Appellants are entitled to seek Declaratory 
Judgment in addition to judicial review. None of the cases cited by EIPHD include a claim for judicial 
review and a Petition for Declaratory Judgment. See Respondent's Brief, pg. 21. The Declaratory 
Judgment portion of the litigation did "commence" by the filing of the Petition as required by 512-121. 
Idaho's Supreme Court has held that filing a petition for declaratory judgment qualifies as the 
commencement of a civil action. See Freiburger v. I-U-8 Engineers, Inc., 141 ldaho 415,423-424,111 
P.3d 100 (2005). EIPHD has not provided any authority that a party seeking both judicial review and 
commencing a civil action for declaratory judgment, as expressly allowed under ldaho Code $39-417, is 
not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to ldaho Code 512-121. EIPHD itself sought attorney fees 
pursuant to 512-121 for i ts  defense of the civil litigation. See Answer and Reply, pg. 8, Clerk's Record, pg. 
58. There simply is no basis to deny attorney fees under 512-121. 
11. EIPHD'S DEFENSE OF THE CIVIL LITIGATION WAS FRIVOLOUS, UNREASONABLE, AND 
WITHOUT FOUNDATION 
EIPHD cites multiple cases in an effort to persuade the Court that its "entire" defense of the 
action was not frivolous and unreasonable. EIPHD claims that "...even if the court found EIPHD's defense 
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of the authority position to be unreasonable or frivolous, the case involved multiple claims and defenses 
and multiple legal and factual issues." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 29. Applicable case law provides the 
appropriate standard: "If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded 
under ldaho Code 012-121 even though the losing party asserted factual or legal claims that may be 
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 28 (citing Kiebert v. Goss, 
144 ldaho 225,159 P.3d 862 (2007). In this case, no "legitimate, triable issues of fact" existed because 
the Court found that ElPHD had absolutely no jurisdiction. As stated above, the District Court found that 
the statute and MOU were clear that jurisdiction over central systems was retained by DEQ and noted 
EIPHD's understanding and acknowledgment of DEQ's exclusive jurisdiction. See Memorandum Decision 
and Order, pg. 8, Clerk's Record, pg. 107. The District Court found that "[tlhere is no genuine dispute 
that at all time relevant the septic system ... fell within the definition of a central system." Id. pg. 7, 
Clerk's Record, pg. 106. Neither party was required to present evidence or argument regarding any 
other issue, because when the Court determined that ElPHD had no jurisdiction, none of the other 
issues remained "legitimate, triable issues of fact." None of EIPHD's defenses survived Appellants' only 
Motion for Summary Judgment, based on the finding that there was no genuine issue that DEQ was the 
sole entity with authority over Appellants' central system. 
D. AVORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
I. Attornev Fees on A ~ ~ e a l  When The Sole Issue is Entitlement to Fees Below 
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal, if Appellants are the prevailing party on 
appeal under the Spidell v. Jenkins holding that: "[wlhen an appeal concerns attorney fees alone, such 
an award will be made to the prevailing party if the issue on appeal includes the entitlement to a fee 
award below and is not limited to the amount." 111 ldaho 857,861,727 P.2d 1285 (Ct.App. 1986) 
(Emphasis in original). This case is authority that if the issue on appeal is entitlement to a fee award 
below, Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal, i f  Appellants prevail on appeal. 
II. Attorney Fees Under 412-117 and 512-121 on ApDeal 
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under either 512-117 or 412-121 if Appellants are the 
prevailing party and the court finds that EIPHD's actions on appeal were without a reasonable basis in 
law or fact or frivolous and unreasonable. EIPHD's claim that "Sunnyside's request for attorney fees 
does not comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(6) because they failed to provide argument in support of their 
request" is  plainly fallacious. Under EIPHD's argument, Appellants would be required to cite, in its 
opening brief, specific evidence in the record concerning EIPHD's actions on appeal before ElPHD had 
filed any briefs or motions. Such an argument would be similar to requiring a complaint to fully explain 
why attorney fees are warranted under 12-121 prior to the litigation. There is simply no way for 
Appellants to know what EIPHD's actions on appeal are going to be until after ElPHD has taken some 
action. Now that EIPHD has filed a meritless Motion to Dismiss and conflicting and unreasonable 
arguments in its "Respondent's Brief," Appellants are now able to provide specific citations "to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon" to satisfy the requirements of 
I.A.R. 35(a)(6). 
Appellants asserted entitlement to attorney fees on appeal under ldaho Code 512-117 and 
512-121. See Appellant's Brief, pg. 21. Attorney fees on appeal under 512-121 can be awarded when a 
party "defended the appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Gustaves v. Gustaves, 
138 ldaho 64,71,57 P.3d 775 (2002). Under 512-117 attorney fees on appeal are to be awarded if the 
Court finds "...that the losing party acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact." Turner v. Twin Falls, 
144 ldaho 203,212,159 P.3d 840 (2007). 
In deciding whether Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under either statute, the first: issue 
for the court is to determine whether Appellants are the prevailing party on appeal. See Brandon Bay v. 
Payette County, 142 ldaho 681,684, 132 P.3d 438 (2006). 
After determining who is prevailing party and under which statute the party prevailed, the Court 
then must analyze EIPHD'sdefense of this appeal to determine if the defense was conducted with a 
reasonable basis in law or fact (under 912-117) or if EIPHD acted frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation (under 512-121). 
The Court should consider the frivolous and unreasonable nature of EIPHD1s Motion to Dismiss, 
filed on August 14, 2008. EIPHD filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal asserting that the appeal should be 
dismissed with prejudice as being untimely and asserting that no judgment had been set forth, making 
the December 10,2007, Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Clerk's 
Record pgs. 200-1 through 200-5 not final and therefore not appealable. See Motion to Dismiss, pg. 2. 
However, after Appellents cited to applicable statute and case law, EIPHD stated in its reply brief the 
following: 
... respondents recognize that, technically speaking, the appeal from the December 10,2007 
order of the Court was timely according to I.A.R. 14(a). Respondents also recognize that ldaho 
courts have held, pursuant to  I.A.R. 11(a)(7), that post judgment orders are independently 
appealable. Ziemann, 121 ldaho at 260. 
See Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pg. 4. (Emphasis Added). EIPHD also acknowledged that 
all of the issues that arose from November 1,2007 order were synonymous with the issues addressed in 
the December 10,2007 order. Id. Despite acknowledging that the December 10,2007 order, covering ail 
issues, was independently appealable and that the Appeal from that order was timely filed, EIPHD 
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continued to argue without any authority that the entire appeal should be dismissed with prejudice. 
EIPHD's filing of the Motion to Dismiss without reference to applicable statutes and case law, and then 
continuing to seek dismissal after acknowledging that the applicable statutes and case law cited by 
Appellants, allowed the appeal, constitute unreasonable and frivolous actions in defense of this appeal. 
There simply was no reasonable basis in law or fact for the Motion to Dismiss. 
The frivolous and unreasonable nature of EIPHD's defense of this appeal is further evidenced by 
the directly conflicting claims of ElPHD that it is not an "agency" under IAPA, and yet claiming that this 
litigation constitutes judicial review of EIPHD's "agency' action under IAPA. ElPHD claims that "EIPHD 
has never claimed that it is a state agency, nor could it ever be so under the current statutory 
framework." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 15. Yet ElPHD claims that judicial review under IAPA is 
appropriate because "Idaho Code 967-5270 also states that '[a] person aggrieved by a final order in a 
contested case decided by an agency ... is entitled to judicial review under this chapter.'" See 
Respondent's Brief, pg. 25. ElPHD cites to ldaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council of City 
of Boise, 134 ldaho 651,653,8 P.3d 646 (2000), forthe proposition that the definition of "agency" under 
567-5201 applies to "state administrative agencies, and not local governing bodies," and then ElPHD 
asserts that "for example, county or city governments do not fall within the definition of "agency" in 
567-5201. See Respondent's Brief, pg. 11. ElPHD intentionally ignored the sentences directly following 
the language ElPHD quoted from ldaho Historic Preservation Council, which holds that specific 
exceptions exist to the general rule making both city and county governments "agencies" for purposes 
of IAPA when they are subject to judicial review under IAPA. See ldaho Historic Preservation Council, lnc. 
v. City Council of City of Boise, 134 ldaho 651,653, 8 P.3d 646 (2000). The portion of ldaho Historic 
Preservation Council, Inc. quoted by EIPHD, when read in context states: 
The language of the IAPA indicates that it is intended to govern the judicial review of decisions 
made by state administrative agencies, and not local governing bodies. There are a few 
statutory exceptions to this general rule, however. For example, the Local Land Use Planning 
Act, Chapter 65, Title 67 of the ldaho Code, provides that a person aggrieved by a planning and 
zoning decision 'may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted 
under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code' I.C. 
67-6521. See also I.C. 523-1016(4) (stating that a city council is  an 'agency' for the purposes of 
applying the judicial review provisions of the IAPA to a city council decision to deny an 
application for or the transfer or renewal of a license to sell beer). 
Id. EIPHD's reliance on Idaho Historic Preservation Council, to claim that as a "local governing body" it is 
not an "agency" under 567-5201 of IAPA is clearly unreasonable and frivolous when the quoted 
language in EIPHD's brief is  read in context. EIPHD's failure to cite this directly applicable holding cannot 
have been accidental. 
EIPHD's actions and arguments in defense of this appeal did not have a reasonable basis in law 
or fact and were both unreasonable and frivolous. As a result, Appellants are entitled to attorney fees 
under either ldaho Code 5 12-117 or 512-121, if Appellants prevail under either statute on the merits of 
the appeal from Judge Tingey's denial of attorney fees at the Administrative and District Court levels. 
CONCLUSlON 
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under ldaho Code 912-117 because ElPHD is an 
"agency" under ldaho Code 965-5201 when ElPHD is subject to judicial review under IAPA. EIPHD's 
actions in reimposition sanitary restrictions were without a reasonable basis in fact or law. ldaho Code 
550-1326 provides specific instances where reimposition of sanitary restrictions is appropriate, however 
no facts supporting reimposition of sanitary restrictions were alleged or proven by EIPHD. Furthermore, 
ElPHD acknowledged and understood that DEQ retained jurisdiction to reimpose sanitary restrictions on 
central systems and the District Court found that there was no genuine issue of fact that Appellants' 
sewer system was a central system. 
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under ldaho Code 912-121 because Appellants had a 
specific right to file a Petition for Declaratory Judgment andlor a Petition for Judicial Review. Case law is 
clear that i f Appellants had simply filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment 912-121 would apply. ElPHD 
has not presented any case law holding that a party loses i ts right to attorney fees under 912-121 if the 
party choose to file both a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and a Petition for Judicial Review as 
allowed by statute. EIPHD's actions in defending its reimposition of sanitary restrictions were frivolous, 
unreasonable, and without foundation. ElPHD continued asserting authority to reimpose sanitary 
restrictions even after multiple ElPHD employees and members of EIPHD's board indicated an 
understanding and acknowledgment that DEQ retained exclusive authority over central systems. There 
was no genuine issue of fact that at all relevant times Appellants operated a central system. Therefore, 
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to ldaho Code 912-121. 
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal, i f  appellants are the prevailing party because 
the only issue in the appeal is entitlement to attorney fees. Furthermore, Appellants are entitled to fees 
under ldaho Code 912-117 and/or $12-121 because EIPHD's actions on appeal have been taken without 
a reasonable basis in law or fact and have been frivolous, unreasonable, and without an adequate 
foundation. 
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